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Where the Standard Approach in Comparative Neuroscience Fails 
and Where It Works: General Intelligence and Brain Asymmetries
What do coarse-grained and taxon-neutral traits, 
such as brain size and intelligence, tell us about neuro-
cognitive systems? What characteristics should a behav-
ioral proxy have to allow us to properly compare cogni-
tive abilities across different taxa? In their article 
“Beyond Brain Size: Uncovering the Neural Correlates 
of Behavioral and Cognitive Specialization,” Logan 
and colleagues address these questions by reviewing 
the literature on the relationship between brain size 
and cognition. In the light of empirical and theoretical 
considerations, the authors suggest that, to understand 
how brain and cognition evolve, comparative biologists 
should focus on fine-grained, taxon-specific phenotypic 
traits within the relevant ecological and adaptive context 
of a given species. This would help to avoid reification, 
defined by the authors as mistaking an operationalized 
target of measurement with a real, causally meaningful 
object.
Although we agree with this conclusion, there are 
two aspects analyzed by Logan and colleagues that we 
think may deserve further consideration. The first is the 
common tendency in comparative research to assess 
human-oriented phenotypic traits in nonhuman species; 
the second is the tendency, which is also widespread, to 
adopt coarse-grained traits, such as brain size, instead 
of fine-grained and more informative traits.
Let us start by considering the first one. A general 
premise of Logan and colleagues’ article is that 
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comparative behavioral research is often characterized 
by a sort of “anthropocentric perspective.” However, as 
the authors argue, human behavioral traits—and the 
related neural bases—are not necessarily shared by other 
species. This argument can be understood as a criticism 
against the so-called Great Chain of Being, a secular 
ideology that assumes a natural hierarchy of organisms 
with humankind at the top and then, successively, lower 
animals from primates to bacteria (see, e.g., Sternberg, 
2017). Logan and colleagues clarify how misleading this 
interpretation of the tree of life is by highlighting the 
importance of the ecological and adaptive context of 
a species: The ability of the organisms to achieve their 
goals should be evaluated within the range of challenges 
they face within their natural environment. Therefore, 
phenotypic traits should be identified by accounting for 
what is actually “meaningful” for a given species rather 
than what is meaningful for humans.
The second central point of the target article 
concerns the use of general, coarse-grained phenotypic 
traits and proxy measures to study cognition. Brain 
size represents, in the authors’ view, a noninforma-
tive measure of neurocognitive systems. Indeed, such 
a broad measure cannot disentangle from one another 
important aspects such as the dimensions of specific 
brain areas, the neuron density, and the connectivity 
patterns between neurons, which may be more informa-
tive than brain size about the properties of a neurocogni-
tive system. Hence, it is not surprising that correlational 
analyses of brain size tend to produce spurious associ-
ations at both the intraspecific and interspecific levels 
(reviewed by Logan et al.).
We recognize that these criticisms could rule out 
misleading assumptions in comparative behavioral 
research. However, although the authors’ arguments 
seem to be applicable to most research about high-level 
psychological constructs, we believe they may miss the 
mark in respect with structural features of nervous 
systems and the related behavioral manifestations. To 
explain our concerns about the approach proposed by 
Logan and colleagues, we use as examples two topics 
in neuroscience: general intelligence and brain asymme-
tries. These two examples elucidate where the coarse-
grained and human-oriented comparative approach fails 
and where instead it can be appropriate and helpful.
The authors’ argument against anthropocentric 
comparative research sounds effective in the case of 
general intelligence and its putative underlying mecha-
nism, namely, the g factor. General intelligence repre-
sents a psychological trait assessed by psychometric IQ 
tests that generally recruit linguistic, mathematical, logi-
cal, and spatial abilities. The g factor, instead, is often 
understood as a domain-general cognitive mechanism 
accounting for both individuals’ performance in tests 
(i.e., the intelligent behavior) and individual intellectual 
differences within populations (see Burkart, Schubiger, 
& van Schaik, 2017; Serpico, 2017; Sternberg & Grigore-
nko, 2002). General intelligence is the subject of heated 
controversy in regards to two aspects tackled by Logan 
and colleagues with respect to brain size, that is, the 
granularity problem and the anthropocentric perspec-
tive widespread in comparative research.
First, exactly like brain size, general intelligence 
represents a coarse-grained evaluation of a cognitive 
system, regardless of any detail about its structural 
and functional composition. However, many schol-
ars have argued that intelligence, rather than reflect-
ing a single neurocognitive mechanism, is composed 
of several distinct and autonomous—but not necessar-
ily  independent—cognitive mechanisms (see Hamp-
shire, Highfield, Parkin, & Owen, 2012; Serpico, 2017; 
Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002; Van der Maas et al., 
2006). Logan and colleagues’ argument about brain 
size is in line with the view that general intelligence, 
like other high-level psychological constructs, does not 
represent an informative measure of neurocognitive 
systems (see Craver, 2009, who discussed the problem of 
subtyping complex psychological traits into lower-level 
characteristics).
Second, we think that general intelligence is exactly 
that sort of human-oriented trait that Logan and 
colleagues criticize as erroneously generalized to other 
species. Although the g factor likely plays a role, if 
any, in human cognition only (indeed, g accounts for 
the population variance in a battery of IQ tests), many 
authors have tried to assess its role in other species. For 
instance, in their review about the evolution of general 
intelligence, Burkart and colleagues (2017) took the g 
factor as a domain-general neurocognitive mechanism 
shared by humans, primates, birds, and rodents. The 
arguments provided by Logan and colleagues against 
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the anthropocentric viewpoint in comparative studies 
seem to us well suited to describe, and possibly to rule 
out, this sort of reification of general intelligence.
By contrast, the arguments provided by the authors 
seem to be less suited to be applied to structural prop-
erties of nervous systems. This is the case of brain 
and behavioral asymmetries, where a sort of human-
oriented, coarse-grained approach seems to be promis-
ing and successful.
Traditionally, lateralization (i.e., the different func-
tional specialization of the right and left sides of the 
nervous system) was considered a uniquely human char-
acteristic, related to handedness and linguistic func-
tions (McManus, 1999). Over the past decades, thanks 
to research conducted in comparative psychology, neuro-
science, and developmental biology, we have realized 
that lateralization is a widespread phenomenon among 
vertebrates (Rogers, Vallortigara, & Andrew, 2013). 
Moreover, there is emerging evidence of behavioral and 
brain asymmetries in invertebrates, suggesting that later-
alization is a feature of simpler as well as more complex 
neurocognitive systems (reviewed by  Frasnelli, 2013).
In most vertebrates, for example, the right hemi-
sphere is involved in responding to unexpected and novel 
stimuli (e.g., predators) and in interacting with conspe-
cifics, and the left hemisphere is specialized in less 
complex and repetitive tasks (e.g., behavioral routines). 
Lateralization also characterizes learning and memory 
both in vertebrates (e.g., in birds; see Andrew, 1999; 
Cipolla-Neto, Horn, & McCabe, 1982; Clayton, 1993) 
and in invertebrates. For instance, honeybees present 
an asymmetrical use of the right and left antennae in 
learning and recalling olfactory memories: recall of 
short-term memory is implemented by the right side, 
whereas recall of long-term memory is possible through 
the left side (see Letzkus et al., 2006; Rogers & Vallorti-
gara, 2008; for a review, see Frasnelli et al., 2014). This 
suggests that the shifts between the two sides of the 
brain from recently acquired information to more inte-
grated and complete long-term records might constitute 
a considerable advantage for both arthropods and verte-
brates. Thus, mechanisms controlling such shifts may 
have evolved, perhaps independently, in both phyla (see 
Frasnelli, Vallortigara, & Rogers, 2012).
In sum, despite differences between the nervous 
systems of humans and other animals, there is good 
evidence that lateralization represents a structural 
feature implemented by similar mechanisms across 
different species and taxa (see Rogers et al., 2013). Thus, 
thanks to these similarities, animal models have allowed 
us to uncover the evolution of behavioral and neural 
asymmetries, and their developmental mechanisms 
as well.
The take-home message is that the approach 
proposed by Logan and colleagues might be promis-
ing for behavioral traits reflecting higher-level cogni-
tive aspects such as general intelligence but be poten-
tially fragile for behavioral traits reflecting lower-level 
structural properties of the nervous system. As we have 
argued, the disagreement about general intelligence 
relies on its generality and on its dubious value in char-
acterizing the neurocognitive system of nonhuman 
species. By contrast, what we know about lateralization 
points at the (partial) adequacy of a human-oriented, 
coarse-grained approach in comparative research.
We do not mean to assume an anthropocentric view-
point. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to think that 
some structural aspects of nervous systems—and their 
behavioral correlates—are highly conserved across 
different taxa, regardless of their granularity. Whether 
the conservation of this kind of traits is due to natu-
ral selection, to the modularity of the related genetic 
processes, or to some sort of developmental constraint 
in brain morphology is an empirical question that future 
research must address.
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